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From November 2001 to April 2003, the International
Monetary Fund grappled with a radical proposal, the
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, for handling the
external debt of insolvent governments of developing and
transition economies. That proposal was rejected, but new
“collective action clauses” that address some of the
difficulties in restructuring bond debt are being introduced.
In addition, IMF is developing a pragmatic and eclectic
approach to assessing debt sustainability that can be useful
to governments and creditors. However, many of the
problems in restructuring sovereign debt remain and this
paper suggests both specific reforms and modalities for
considering them.
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Views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily
of the United Nations. This paper carries forward a discussion
originally prepared for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-four
on International Monetary Affairs Technical Meeting in Port of
Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on 13 and 14 February 2003 (see
Herman, 2003). Comments of participants in that meeting have
helped shape this paper and are gratefully acknowledged, as are those
of an anonymous referee of an earlier draft paper.
A new sense of calm descended on the international
markets for emerging-economy debt in mid-2003. The
calm was seen in rising international market prices of
sovereign bonds of emerging economies in the first half
of the year and good sales of new bond issues, in
particular those of Brazil and Mexico, as well as the
successful completion of Uruguay’s bond exchange
offer. Market nervousness before then had been set off
by two developments in 2001: the Argentine
Government’s slide into the largest default ever and
the fear of contagion in other countries, and the proposal
in November by Anne Krueger, the First Deputy
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), to create a new international insolvency regime
for governments that could no longer service their
foreign debt.
The IMF proposal, coupled with the Argentine
crisis, was read by the financial markets as a message
that the IMF and the major industrialized countries were
setting definite limits on their willingness to extend
international liquidity to emerging economies in
balance-of-payments crisis. Large amounts of funds
could still be mobilized in support of policy reforms
for countries deemed to be cooperating in resolving their
difficulties, especially where there was a major global
security interest, as had been the case in Turkey during
the same period. Even in security-sensitive situations,
however, default had to be considered a realistic
possibility, as the Russian crisis had shown in 1998.
The IMF proposal thus said, in essence, that if defaults
were going to happen, then a better mechanism was
needed to restructure the debt, especially as there would
be limits to the financial efforts to prevent them.
In fact, modest changes have been made in how
future sovereign insolvencies will be treated, and the
international financial markets and government issuers
alike have accepted them. They address certain concerns
about how the external bond debt of crisis countries is
restructured, although some market participants
discount the likelihood that those concerns were any
more than theoretical difficulties. This paper will argue
that the changes that were adopted leave unresolved
the basic concerns that made the IMF proposal so
important, namely its implicit recognition that an
adequate, timely and fair restructuring of external debt
should be an assured part of the international policy to
assist insolvent countries. The hard part is figuring out
how to do that.
The international financial markets have for the
time being discounted the concern that something is
missing in the international mechanisms for treating
problem debt, as they are looking with increasing favour
on emerging economies in 2003.1 While the Argentine
debt situation was still unresolved as of the time of
writing in August 2003, Argentina’s economy had
begun to recover behind more effective macroeconomic
policies. Perhaps most significantly, the market no
longer feared that other large sovereign debtors would
newly seek to restructure their debt at this time. In other
words, the change in government in Brazil had been
smooth and the IMF proposal for radical reform of the
debt relief process did not gain the broad support
necessary for its enactment.
Indeed, the IMF proposal had generated significant
opposition among developing-country governments,
especially in Latin America, and in financial markets
that lend heavily to this region. The United States
Government gave the coup de grâce to the proposal at
the April 2003 meeting of the Fund’s International
Monetary and Financial Committee when it declined
to support further work on it. Nevertheless, economic
policy in response to default has not changed at all and
the existing debt workout mechanisms remain a
haphazard collection of not necessarily coherent
I
Introduction
1 This notwithstanding, market professionals have not been expecting
developing countries to see more than a modest net increase in flows
in 2003 (Institute of International Finance, 2003).
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processes. If the IMF proposal was not an adequate way
to achieve the desired outcome, neither are the modest
changes that were adopted.
The discussion that follows seeks to outline the
essential characteristics of default on external sovereign
debt (section II) and why debt restructuring is
inescapably difficult (section III). Section IV then
discusses the IMF proposal and its shortcomings. Section
V describes changes that have been introduced in 2003
in relation to sovereign bond restructuring and how
these have left open many important questions. Section
VI concludes by suggesting how to work towards a
more adequate, timely and fair process for restructuring
the external debt of countries in crisis.
II
Insolvency and the nature
of the policy intervention
Any debt crisis represents a failure. All borrowers
solemnly pledge to repay their loans with interest
according to a fixed schedule in a contract. Default
violates the contract. Pledged collateral may cover more
or less of the debtor’s obligations to the creditor, but
unsecured loans, as to governments, leave the creditors
fully exposed to loss. What can or should the creditors
do to recover their funds? What rules should they
operate under and who should make those rules?
In the eighteenth century in Europe and the United
States, defaulters went to prison. This usually did not
help the creditors recover their loans, although it was
believed to discourage default. Prison under harsh
conditions was the ultimate policy to deal with the
“moral hazard” that people might take on excessive debt
without adequate consideration of their obligation to
repay. However, with the spread of “limited liability”
corporations as a means of undertaking business
activity, creditors of defaulting corporations could
collect only the remaining assets of the insolvent
company to cover their unsecured loans. Creditors could
not touch the personal wealth of the owners or
managers, let alone send them to prison, although
insolvent companies ceased to exist. This effectively
limited creditor rights of recovery and in doing so
fostered the larger accumulation of funds needed by
the business entities that became the backbone of the
industrialization of the now-developed world.
Corporate insolvency meant the assured death of
the company, which was possibly too drastic, until a
new idea took hold. This idea was that sometimes
restructuring the firm under court supervision but with
the “debtor in possession” could salvage it and thus
protect more of the claims of the creditors, not to
mention the jobs of its employees, than closing down
the firm, breaking it up and selling its assets. This
approach began in the United States in the nineteenth
century as an emergent practice to handle defaults of
railroad companies, although it was later codified in
the famous Chapter XI of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.2 Defaults by government borrowers have an even
longer history than corporate defaults and have
necessarily always been matters of restructuring.3
Today, personal bankruptcies are also matters of debt
restructuring, as there are no more debtors’ prisons.
In each case in which debt restructuring is applied,
whether personal, corporate or sovereign, the object of
the restructuring is to help the bankrupt entity make a
new start, sacrificing as many of the claims of the
creditors as warranted but not more than is deemed
necessary. Where to draw the line is, of course, the
difficult part. The debtor should be expected to survive
after the restructuring and not need subsequent relief
under normal circumstances and sound management.
Concepts of social justice place limits on how close to
survival minimums the creditors should be allowed to
put the debtor; e.g., indentured servitude (in effect,
temporary slavery) is no longer allowed in personal
bankruptcy. But should the debtor “prosper” on the back
of creditor losses? In the case of sovereign bankruptcy,
2 See Bolton (2002).
3 It has even been argued that relations between sovereigns and their
creditors have been an important factor in shaping the development
of “Western civilization”; e.g., they are said to have been an
important determinant in the growth of democracy (Schultz and
Weingast, 2003; Macdonald, 2003).
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the answer is yes. Poor countries, in particular, should
have the opportunity to become rich countries even if
they default at some point on their loan repayments
and need to restructure their debt. At least, this is
presumed to be a general principle.
In cases of personal and corporate insolvency, the
domestic court system oversees the debt workout, as
loans are legal contracts subject to court enforcement.
This also gives some comfort to the debtor these days,
as the courts operate under the legal and political
apparatus of the State and are expected to apply
constitutional principles and societal norms in their
decisions. The first problem in the case of sovereign
default on external loans is that there is no global court
to oversee the process and ensure it is “fair” as might
be defined in some form of international law.
The second problem in sovereign default also stems
from the absence of any global bankruptcy court. Most
debtors have obligations to multiple creditors. Any one
creditor may not even know about the existence of the
others, or the amounts owed to each or to all of them
together. A bankruptcy court facilitates bringing all the
creditors together and organizing their negotiations
according to the principles and processes stipulated in
the legislated guidelines of the relevant bankruptcy law.
In the case of defaulting sovereigns, there are only
political understandings to govern the amount and
allocation of debt relief, and ad hoc and informal practices
to organize the actual negotiations. Debts owed to major
government creditors are restructured in the Paris Club,
largely represented by the interests of their export credit
agencies. Paris Club members determine among
themselves what terms to offer (on advice from IMF) and
then press the debtor to obtain comparable terms from
non-Paris Club official creditors and from private lenders
(multilateral institutions being exempt from debt
restructuring in most cases). Debts owed to commercial
banks are usually renegotiated with an advisory
committee (London Club), which reaches a tentative
agreement with the government that it puts to the bank
creditors for decision. Debts in the form of international
bonds have been the hardest to restructure and have been
the focus of the recent policy reforms, which aim to make
reaching agreement easier than in the past (see below).
Each member of each of the main creditor groups
and other creditors as well (e.g., unpaid suppliers to
the government) are motivated to maximize their
individual loan recovery, even at the expense of the
other creditors. Nevertheless, the clubs of government
and bank creditors and the bondholder arrangements
under the new reforms can impose a measure of
discipline on members of their groups through contract
or informal pressures. There is no formal mechanism
to ensure that sacrifice is comparable or appropriate
across the groupings of creditors or that overall relief
is sufficient for realizing the presumed general goal,
that the remaining debt not prevent the economy from
being able to develop.
IMF usually plays an informal role in coordinating
the creditors and assessing the adequacy of relief, as
part of its broader engagement with debt-crisis
countries. But while a bankruptcy judge at domestic
level would follow legal guidelines and precedents, the
staff of IMF follows political guidelines given by the
International Monetary and Financial Committee at
ministerial level and the IMF Executive Board at
operational level. Moreover, each debtor country’s
overall programme has to be approved by the Executive
Board, which also monitors its implementation. In other
words, instead of a legal/judicial approach, IMF follows
a political one, wherein the relative influence of
different countries on the Board reflects the size of their
shareholding in the Fund.
IMF also differs importantly from a court in that it
is not a neutral party to the matter being decided. IMF is
itself a creditor, moreover a “preferred” creditor that
must be paid before non-preferred creditors. In the
preferred creditor institutions (mainly IMF, the World
Bank and the regional development banks), the main
shareholders are said to be willing for their institution
to lend to countries in crisis when other creditors will
not because they are assured they will be first in line to
be repaid. Thus, when IMF negotiates an adjustment
programme with a defaulting government, all creditors
understand that IMF will seek to ensure that there is
sufficient hard currency cash flow to service the
outstanding loans of itself and the other preferred
creditors. The quid pro quo is that these multilateral
creditors in fact extend new loans and the defaulted
creditors will press to have those loans be as large as
possible, indeed large enough to constitute a “bail-out”
and erase prospective private creditor losses.
The required amount of debt relief (certainly its
phasing over time) thus depends in part on the size of
new lending by IMF and other multilateral creditors,
besides any bilateral loans and grants that might be
accorded by different departments of the same
governments that are negotiating debt relief in the Paris
Club. It also depends on other prospective financial
flows into and out of the country, the exchange rate,
and targets for the balance of trade in goods and services
and the government’s fiscal position, and
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simultaneously for the growth of output and income in
the crisis country. One may imagine an iterative process
involving IMF as coordinator, the debtor country
government, its official multilateral and bilateral
creditors (including IMF as lender), and the various sets
of defaulted private and official creditors, wherein
alternative packages of domestic macroeconomic
policies, new financial commitments and debt relief are
considered, albeit not simultaneously, until a consistent
package is accepted at least by all the major players.
That package reflects the bargaining strength of each
group and is not necessarily optimal from the
perspective of any one of them, let alone of the people
in the crisis country who bear the brunt of the economic
adjustment that accompanies the debt workout.
Indeed, the local people are probably the group
least consulted in developing the package, a complaint
that has led large coalitions of non-governmental
organizations working in heavily indebted countries
to call for the current approach to be replaced by a
“fair and transparent arbitration process”.4 Yes, but
arbitration is a form of legal process for dispute
resolution, like a bankruptcy court, and this leaves
open the question of what guidelines the arbitrators
should follow and who should set, review and revise
them over time. While the legislature is the answer
to such questions at national level, treaties among
governments are the general answer at the global





Instead of determining the debt relief package by
negotiation, might it be determined by dispassionate
analysis? The answer is no. Whether or not there is any
such thing as an “optimal” debt relief package, there is
no way to determine what that package is. The
experience of IMF and the World Bank in trying over
the years to determine how much debt relief is required
for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs)
illustrates the problem: even in these financially simpler
cases in which almost all of the debt is owed to official
agencies, much of the analysis and thus the decisions
have to be judgemental. Decisions in such an
environment are inevitably reached through negotiation.
Debtors press for as much relief as possible and
creditors —even official ones who might have been
thought able to make the political decision to approach
the situation from a broad development perspective,
given the relatively small sums at stake— seek to give
away as little as possible.
Before the HIPC Initiative was launched to lower
such countries’ debts, creditor governments only
gradually and reluctantly agreed on the need to accord
increasingly large reductions in the stock of debt owed
them by HIPCs, while no rescheduling, let alone
reduction, of multilateral loans was even contemplated.
In 1996, the World Bank and IMF launched the HIPC
Initiative, which required that creditor governments
finally address the essential question of how much the
debt had to be cut to leave the HIPCs with a “sustainable”
debt level, understanding that for possibly about 40
countries this could mean extremely deep cuts in
obligations to creditor governments and reduced
obligations to the multilateral institutions, as well as to
all other creditors.5
4 For a detailed presentation, see Fritz and Hersel (2002). Major
advocates for this approach include Jubilee Research (New
Economics Foundation), Jubilee Germany (erlassjahr.de ),
International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE),
Caritas Internationalis, and other organizations (important initial and
continuing work on the idea has been done by Kunibert Raffer at
the University of Vienna).
5 The debt relief objective of the HIPC Initiative evolved from
“reducing debt as part of a broader strategy to achieve long-run
sustainability” in preliminary analytical work in 1995, to “reducing
debt to sustainable levels and thus providing a durable exit strategy
from the rescheduling process” in the original World Bank/IMF
formulation of the Initiative in 1996, to “providing a robust exit
from debt rescheduling and the achievement of debt sustainability”
in 1998 in a Bank/Fund paper, to a “permanent exit from the
rescheduling process and a clear exit from unsustainable debt” in
the 1999 enhancement of the HIPC Initiative (World Bank, 2003,
p. 12, italics in original).
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For political reasons, the guidelines for how much
relief to give each country needed to be relatively simple
and comparable across countries. The HIPC Initiative
thus established rules of thumb for what key debt and
macroeconomic indicators should be after completion
of all HIPC relief. The primary indicator was that the
debt of each HIPC should be brought down to between
200% and 250% of its exports after debt reduction. The
HIPC Initiative had planned for up to six years of country
policy reform and monitoring, with calculation at an
intermediate benchmark called the “decision point” of
the relief that would be given at the “completion point”.
In its initial form, the IMF and World Bank were to
forecast from the decision point what the debt/export
ratio would be at the completion point and thus how
much debt relief was needed to meet the target. In the
1999 HIPC enhancement, both the target ratio and the
means of calculating it were changed. The target ratio
was reduced to 150% on the grounds that the HIPCs
needed an “appropriate cushion”. Explanations aside,
this was an admission that the higher ratio
underestimated the necessary amount of relief. In
addition, instead of a forecast, data at the time of the
decision point were to be used to estimate the relief
needed to meet the target. This would presumably help
control for over-optimistic forecasts. Moreover, the
amount of relief at the completion point could be
“topped up” if it were decided that the country’s debt
situation had changed “fundamentally” from the
decision to completion points (i.e., if its post-relief debt/
export ratio would otherwise remain significantly above
the target).
Additional specifications had to be made before
the seemingly simple debt/export indicator could
actually be measured. Firstly, as was proposed in the
HIPC enhancement, the denominator of the debt/export
ratio should be the value of exports in the decision-
point year. Uganda was the first country to qualify for
HIPC relief and it complained that as its export prices
had been at a cyclical peak, it would receive insufficient
relief under such a calculation. Instead, Uganda argued
for an average of the past six years’ exports. That was
considered too pessimistic (too favourable to Uganda)
and a three-year average was approved, which became
the standard for the 1999 enhancement (World Bank,
2003, box. 4.1).
It was also decided that the numerator in the ratio
should not be the nominal amount of debt, but the
present value of the future debt-servicing stream. This
is an appropriate calculation to make, as much of the
debt of the HIPCs is concessional and the nominal debt
level would overstate the effective debt to be serviced.
However, the net present value (NPV) of debt-servicing
obligations depends on how it is calculated. The higher
the discount rate is, the smaller will be the present value
of any given stream of obligations over time. The
discount rate should reflect the opportunity cost of hard
currency funds for the government, assuming for
convenience that the funds would be held in official
foreign exchange reserves if not utilized for debt
servicing. But what should that interest rate be? The
“proper” rate is an unknown future interest rate over
the debt-servicing horizon. The current practice is to
take six-month historical averages of the yields on five-
year government bonds for each currency of the debt
(IMF, 2003b, pp. 19-21). However, the discount rate
calculated this way in 2000 would have been
significantly higher than that calculated in 2003,
meaning more relief would be deemed necessary in
2003 than three years before to reach the same NPV/
export ratio. Indeed, international interest rates are
expected to rise again in ensuing years, which means
the calculated NPV on an unchanged stream of debt
servicing would correspondingly shrink.
One may thus see that there was room for dispute
and negotiation by the creditor and debtor governments
and staff of the Bretton Woods institutions on each
element in the calculation of what is in the end a
relatively arbitrary rule of thumb (e.g., it takes no
account of the import side of the balance of payments).
Moreover, IMF has recently proposed a general
definition of “debt sustainability” that is itself a good
argument against any rule of thumb, namely, “a situation
in which a borrower is expected to be able to continue
servicing its debts without an unrealistically large future
correction to the balance of income and expenditure”
(IMF, 2002a, p. 4). This is an attractive definition
because it draws attention to the possible impact of
“debt correction” on the people in a debt-crisis country.
In essence, it takes account of the fact that sovereign
defaults are political decisions about which government
expenditure obligations to meet and which not to meet,
rather than an absolute absence of funds. Indeed,
governments could decide to squeeze their populations
a great deal in order to avoid actual default, and that
situation would be deemed “unsustainable” under the
Fund’s definition.
While conceptually attractive, this definition of
sustainability is not simple to make operational. Indeed
IMF has adopted a complex framework for monitoring
debt sustainability (IMF, 2002a and 2002b). The
essential element, it implicitly argues, is not whether a
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country gets to the “proper” debt/export ratio after its
debt is restructured, but whether the country has a
reasonable chance to keep whatever debt level it starts
with from rising back to unsupportable levels. This
depends, inter alia, on export growth (and for low-
income countries, often an ability to diversify exports),
terms-of-trade trends, broadening the tax base and
efficiently managing public expenditure (recalling this
is about sovereign debt), as well as trends in foreign
direct investment, capital flight, whether there is a
natural catastrophe or sustained civil unrest and, for
low-income countries, how much of their financial
assistance is provided in grant form, etc.
IMF has routinely undertaken exercises to assess
debt sustainability in the context of its macroeconomic
projections, but independent analysts such as the United
States Government Accounting Office and the World
Bank’s own Operations Evaluation Department (OED)
have found the ones prepared on the HIPC countries in
particular to be unclear and insufficiently documented.
OED has thus called for “a more transparent, explicit,
and consistent methodology for the debt projections that
connects all the relevant components of the fiscal
budget, national accounts, financial flows and the
balance of payments” (World Bank, 2003, p. 24).
World Bank management accepted this
recommendation, as did IMF implicitly when it began
to bring together different aspects of its monitoring of
member country performance and outlook into a more
coherent framework of variables to track and forecast
so that external and public-sector debt sustainability
could be assessed over the medium term. It also decided
to carry out standard sensitivity analyses on the
forecasts (such as evolution under historical norms
instead of the baseline forecast), along with “stress
tests” (more extreme scenarios). It sees the purpose of
this framework, which will evolve in the light of
experience in use, as being “to make better informed
judgements possible and to discipline those judgements
by laying bare the basis on which they are made, rather
than to distil a single measure of sustainability that
would eliminate the need for judgement” (IMF, 2002a,
p. 24). As though to underline the point, the word
“judgement” appears 22 times in the 40 pages of text
in the IMF framework paper. Moreover, the Fund
eschews any estimate of the probability that any of its
scenarios will happen (perforce including the baseline),
leaving that judgement also to the “user” (IMF, 2002a,
p. 25).
The remaining question is who are the users? The
IMF staff put this question to its Executive Board in
reviewing the framework. As the Managing Director
summarized the discussion: “Clearly there is a tension,
in this regard, between the view that publication would
enhance the credibility of the Fund’s sustainability
assessments and strengthen its accountability (the staff
view), and the concern that, given the sensitivity of
the subject, publication could lead to misinterpretations
by the public and adverse market impacts” (IMF, 2002a,
p. 3).
As the IMF framework itself is already public, and
as private creditors use similar methodologies in
assessing the outlook in emerging economies, it seems
that governments should welcome Fund publication of
its assessment and a general debate about it. That debate
should inform decisions by legislatures on budgets,
analyses by journalists and academics who follow
developments in the economy, civil society advocates
and of course potential and actual creditors and
investors.6 Moreover, as sovereign debt restructuring
is actually a political process, as argued here, it should
allow for the broadest feasible debate on its terms by
all the relevant stakeholders.
6 A case for a continuous mechanism for conversation between a
government and its creditors, which could draw upon the Fund’s
debt sustainability framework, is made in Herman (2003).
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The argument thus far is that debt crisis workouts are
inescapably matters for negotiation among the relevant
stakeholders rather than analytical solution, and that
the court-supervised processes and guidelines that
facilitate debt negotiations in a domestic context have
only an informal, partial and political counterpart for
the case of sovereign debt. When IMF proposed creating
a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in
late 2001, it at first appeared that it was proposing a
global bankruptcy court for governments. In fact, much
less was being proposed, although it was far more than
was politically acceptable.
The SDRM might have brought all the creditors of
a government in external debt crisis together for a
comprehensive set of debt negotiations. IMF did propose
bringing all the classes of private creditors (commercial
banks, bondholders, suppliers) into the SDRM and left
open the question of whether bilateral government
creditors would be incorporated as another class or
would conduct a parallel negotiation.7 As the Paris Club
expressed the view that there was no need (desire) to
change its operations, it was effectively dropped from
the SDRM.8
Even restricted to private creditors, the IMF
proposal would have been a major innovation. It
proposed, in particular, creating a new international
legal mechanism, the Sovereign Debt Dispute
Resolution Forum (SDDRF), which would have had
some of the responsibilities of an international
bankruptcy court. After being called upon by a
defaulting government, it would have overseen the
formation of different classes of the country’s creditors
into negotiating groups, validated the claims of
individual creditors, and resolved disputes on the
placement of individual creditors into the different
classes. It would also have been able to prevent
individual creditors from disrupting the SDRM process,
although there was no agreement on whether SDDRF
needed the ability to block legal actions in domestic
courts against the debtor government (i.e., enforce a
“stay on litigation”) or whether a more limited set of
powers would suffice.9 Finally, it would have overseen
creditor voting within each class, as on such matters as
who should represent them in their negotiations or on
the final agreement.
Each of the chosen group negotiators would then
have been charged with developing with the
government a precise restructuring proposal for their
class of creditors. In addition, a steering committee of
the various classes of creditors might have been formed
to coordinate their various negotiations and check on
the coherence of the overall financial package that
emerged (one reason it would have been desirable to
have the Paris Club inside the SDRM process). The
government would then have formally proposed the
component draft agreements to each class, which would
have voted on them, all of this overseen by the SDDRF.
The overall debt agreement would have been considered
adopted when approved by 75% of the outstanding
principal of registered claims in each class (IMF, 2002c,
especially paragraphs 157-168 and 183-208).
While the negotiations would probably have begun
with a draft IMF adjustment programme and a target
overall level of debt relief, the steering committee would
IV
The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
fails to solve the problem
7 The SDRM was not intended to be used for HIPCs and so it was
assumed that multilateral creditors would not be part of the debt
negotiations per se.
8 In its final report to the International Monetary and Financial
Committee, the Fund staff left the exclusion of bilateral official
claims in “square brackets”, meaning not yet agreed and requiring
further discussion (IMF, 2003a, paragraph 3d). Later in the year, the
finance ministers of the Group of Seven (2003) decided that the
Paris Club should modify its approach to restructuring, adopting an
approach more comparable to that taken by private creditors when
they agree to reduce the debt stock (as through bond swaps), in
contrast to repeated traditional Paris Club rescheduling of debt
servicing obligations.
9 One alternative was the “hotchpot rule”, which in essence would
subtract from a successfully litigating creditor’s share of a final group
settlement whatever was won through its litigation, neutralizing its
gain. Another proposal was to give SDDRF the power to enjoin
enforcement of individual creditor court actions that would otherwise
undermine the collective restructuring agreement (IMF, 2002c,
paragraphs 124-141).
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presumably have been able to raise questions in its own
meetings about the overall adequacy of the programme
and the envelope of presumed new multilateral and
bilateral official financing.10 The steering committee
could conceivably even have reached the conclusion
that the overall financial and policy package would not
lead the country to a sustainable debt situation (owing
to pessimistic export forecasts, say), in which case their
post-agreement credits would have been of uncertain
value, not to mention defeating the purpose of the debt
restructuring exercise itself. In that case, the committee
might have sought a way to urge the debtor government
to reopen its discussions with IMF, and right here it may
be seen that the closeness of IMF to the SDRM was a
problem: where would that discussion have taken place?
It does not appear that such concerns could have been
addressed to the SDDRF, which was not intended to have
a substantive role. Perhaps the only avenue open to the
creditors would have been to reject the debt
restructuring package by voting it down, ending the
SDRM oversight. In other words, formalizing the debt
renegotiation mechanism without a coherence
mechanism would have omitted a necessary counterpart
to the informal or even implicit iterations between
government, creditors and IMF in the existing process.
In effect, IMF would have been “just behind the
curtains” during the debtor government’s negotiations
with the different classes of creditors, as it is today.11
There was, however, an effort to create a space between
IMF and the more legal side of SDRM. That is, the Fund
proposed a complicated mechanism for selecting the
SDDRF judges, by which relevant international
organizations and professional associations would have
advised the Managing Director of IMF on prospective
candidates for a “selection panel” that would in turn
have recommended names to him for selection as
candidates for the pool of judges. The Managing
Director would then have formed his list of candidates
and submitted it for approval or rejection as a whole
by the IMF Board of Governors (IMF, 2002c, paragraphs
233-244 and 2003a, paragraph 13a).
The reason such a tortuous process was proposed
for selecting judges was tied to how IMF proposed
bringing the SDRM into being. As SDRM was presented
as a “statutory” approach to sovereign debt
restructuring, the idea was that it would become part
of international law and have a number of mandatory
features. The traditional way to create international law
is through treaty, but IMF proposed a short cut, namely
that SDRM be adopted as an amendment to the Fund’s
Articles of Agreement, which is a treaty to which all
Fund member countries are bound, whether or not they
vote for the amendment. Needing to create the SDDRM
in an amendment to the Fund’s Articles meant that it
had to specify how to select the judges within IMF
governance mechanisms. It would not have been
feasible for IMF to engage or commit another
international institution or body through an article of
its own constitutional agreement. Were the SDRM to
have been adopted by a stand-alone treaty, the process
for selection of the SDDRF judges could have been
designed in a more straightforward way. They could
have been chosen by other credible international
processes, utilizing say the United Nations or a separate
governance body established under a free-standing
SDRM treaty.
The question of how to design a statutory approach
to sovereign debt restructuring was rendered moot by
the April 2003 decision of the IMF’s ministerial
committee. One may only speculate whether a
“statutory approach” might have succeeded had it been
approached differently, with IMF perceived as less at
the centre or as striving less aggressively for quick
closure on the process. Given how radical the reform
was and how unprepared the international community
had been to consider it, it might have been more fruitful
first to open a process of dialogue and consensus-
building among relevant stakeholders, followed later
by formal negotiation, leading ultimately to a stand-
alone treaty that could have gained the support of debtor
as well as creditor governments. Given that there is an
international consensus on the need for clear rules on
insolvency and creditors’ rights in non-sovereign cases,
in particular where there are cross-border issues (e.g.,
foreign obligations of a bankrupt firm, including taxes
owed to foreign governments) and given the work that
has been done on them in recent years, as in the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) and the World Bank, it could have been
agreed that global rules would also be helpful for cases
of sovereign default. This is not to say that it would
have been simple or quick to arrive at agreed processes,
let alone that the world’s governments were ready to
begin the consideration in 2002. A statutory approach
10 As was the practice under the bank advisory committees in the
1980s, steering committees would probably have set up their own
technical economic subcommittees to advise them.
11 In fact, sometimes IMF takes a more forceful advocacy role on
behalf of the government, as was the case in actively supporting
Uruguay’s bond exchange offer in 2003 (IMF, 2003c, p. 204).
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can take time, but be worth it, as the “Law of the Sea”,
which took a decade to negotiate, seems to suggest.
An even bigger question is the degree to which
IMF should be at the centre of any judicial-type process
that might evolve in the future to better handle sovereign
debt restructuring negotiations. As a public international
institution, IMF should be mandated to always take
independent positions in the best interest of its clients,
which are ultimately the people in the borrowing
countries. In practice, the Fund’s shareholders have
diverse interests and the client governments of IMF are
its minority shareholders. In other words, it is incumbent
on the majority shareholders to protect the
independence of the Fund in striving for global financial
stability (its original mandate) and development, a
mandate it and its shareholders accepted in the
Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000a) and
the Monterrey Consensus (United Nations, 2002).
Shareholders should thus avoid using IMF for domestic
political or foreign policy purposes. Do they usually
do this? Probably. Have they always done so? No. IMF
is inescapably vulnerable to pressure from its major
shareholders, who may in turn feel pressed to follow
foreign policy, financial-sector or other agendas through
influence over IMF. In short, a political institution is
not likely to function well in a judicial role.
V
The limited contribution of collective
action clauses
Although radical reform of the debt restructuring
process is no longer being actively discussed in
intergovernmental forums, a number of narrower
reforms are being adopted through changes in specific
clauses of sovereign bond contracts. The concern is to
get the cooperation of individual bondholders when it
is necessary to ease the financial terms of the bonds of
a country in debt crisis. Specific clauses are needed
because were holders of a bond issue free to participate
or not in a restructuring of a bond, then any individual
bondholder would have an incentive not to participate
in the expectation that the participation of the others
would free up enough financial resources to fully
service the remaining original bonds. As a result, too
many bondholders would try to be “free riders” and
the restructuring would fail.
The solution to this “collective action” problem
under New York law, which accounts for about 70%
of international sovereign bonds, has been to require
agreement of all bondholders to change any financial
terms, although other clauses could be changed with
specified majorities. This makes it extremely difficult
to change the financial terms, which was a solution in
earlier decades when most international commercial
sovereign lending was by banks. That is, bonds
generally continued to be serviced even when
governments defaulted on their bank loans. Today,
much more international lending is in the form of
bonds and a way was needed to facilitate collective
action in cases of default.12 Bonds issued in London
under British law or in Japan already have the basic
shape of the answer, as they do not require full
consensus, but instead specify super-majorities needed
to change the financial terms. If the specified majority
agrees, the terms of the bond are changed for all
holders, so there can be no holdouts.
The question thus became what, precisely, should
be the content of the new “collective action clauses”
(CACs)? Two sets of model clauses have been
produced, one by a working group of the Group of
Ten (G-10), endorsed by its ministers and governors
(Group of Ten, 2003), and the other by seven major
organizations from the international financial sector
12 In fact, there is a mechanism to force a restructuring on an
unwilling minority of bondholders on condition that the majority
needed to change the non-financial terms of a bond agree. In this
mechanism, called “exit consents”, holders of a defaulted bond agree
to swap it for a new issue with easier terms for the borrower and at
the same time change the non-financial terms of the old bond in
such a way as to make it a much inferior security (e.g., repealing the
waiver of sovereign immunity, without which governments cannot
be taken to court for violating the terms of the contract). The new
contract clauses would make this approach unnecessary and allow
the issue to be addressed more directly and openly.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3 75
UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN  THE INTERNATIONAL  DIALOGUE ON DEBT •  BARRY  HERMAN
(EMTA and others, 2003).13 There was no participation
by the emerging-economy governments that issue
sovereign bonds in either of these exercises. However,
in a sense their views are beginning to be provided, ex
post facto, through the precedents being established by
bonds issued with CACs in 2003, as by Brazil, Mexico,
South Africa and Uruguay.
The primary focus of attention has been on how
big the majority should be to change the financial terms
of a bond, and who should vote. The G-10 proposed
that 75% of qualified bondholders be required for
approval and the private-sector organizations proposed
85% approval plus no more than 10% explicitly
objecting to the change.14 In the new bond issues with
CACs, all but Brazil specified the 75% voting majority,
with Brazil accepting 85%. At this point it is not clear
if the market practice will settle at 75% for the best
credits and 85% for countries the market assesses as
higher risk, or if 75% will become standard.
It is of course too early to tell how well these
clauses will work in an actual crisis, since they are being
introduced by countries that enjoy market access and
are not in default. Presumably the clauses will facilitate
restructuring of individual bond issues, should the need
arise. Depending on how the clauses are specified, they
may also facilitate “aggregation” of different bond
issues (as in Uruguay’s CACs) and their treatment in
one larger restructuring proposal. Other clauses are
expected to deter legal action by “rogue creditors” or
“vulture funds” that try to recoup the face value of
distressed bonds through national courts.
The clauses may thus bring bonds more firmly
within the nexus of restructurable sovereign debt and
establish procedures that would serve, like the Paris
and London Clubs, for a debt-crisis country to organize
negotiations with this class of its creditors. While
sovereign bonds have been restructured in the past, if
CACs make the process more assured and clear, it will
be a useful contribution. It would also be valuable to
the degree that it reduced uncertainty among bond
investors and increased global demand for such bonds.
Most observers, however, think the latter effect will be
minimal, especially as a large number of bond investors
do not “buy and hold” but are constantly moving
securities into and out of their portfolios (indeed, one
general question is how to make emerging-market debt
more attractive to long-term investors).
Yet this is not the end of the story, as even the
financial-sector organizations have acknowledged that
CACs address only one part of the problem in
restructuring sovereign debt. This can be seen in the
draft Code of Conduct for Emerging Markets that they
issued as part of their package of CAC materials. The
code specifies how a government should organize and
deal with all its different classes of creditors in a debt
crisis, as well as how the private creditors, IMF and key
governments should behave. The emphasis is on taking
a comprehensive, transparent and cooperative approach.
This includes engaging in regular dialogue with key
investors and creditors through an advisory group,
disclosing details regarding all outstanding financial
obligations, including proposed restructurings as well
as central aspects of economic policies and
programmes, including all assumptions, commitments
and targets involved in any IMF-supported programme,
meeting with representatives of bondholders and other
key creditors and negotiating promptly, in good faith,
and directly with a broadly representative group of
creditors, and seeking a comparable rescheduling from
all official bilateral creditors.
Private creditors are told in the draft code not to
expect an IMF bail-out, to maintain trade-credit lines
and roll over short-term maturities, and to negotiate in
good faith. The code also urges IMF and the G-10 to
support the process and it proposes that a Joint
Monitoring Group drawn from debtor and creditor
governments, private investors and creditors, IMF and
the Bank for International Settlements should review
compliance with the code. As this observer reads the
code, the private financial organizations are
acknowledging the essential coherence problem that the
SDRM was intended to address and that remains to be
addressed.
13 The seven are the Emerging Markets Creditors Association, the
Emerging Markets Traders Association (EMTA), the Institute of
International Finance, the International Primary Market Association,
the International Securities Market Association, the Securities
Industry Association and the Bond Market Association.
14 Both sets of model clauses would exclude from voting any bonds
held by the issuing government or controlled by it and reject the
practice of requiring voting by a quorum of participants in a
bondholders’ meeting, requiring instead that all bondholders be
offered the chance to vote by written consent with no need for a
formal meeting.
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Clearly, a lot has happened in 2002 and 2003 regarding
how sovereign debt should be treated in crisis situations.
A comprehensive reform proposal, the SDRM, was
developed but not accepted, while changes were made
in bond contracts that will alter how bond debt will be
handled in future crises. Meanwhile, considerable effort
has also gone into trying to specify a practical
framework for assessing debt sustainability in both low-
and middle-income countries, which should help inform
future debt workouts, as well as assist governments in
avoiding unsustainable debt situations. And yet, much
remains to be done.
The private sector’s draft code of conduct, as noted
above, identifies the problem, but it is only a first step
toward the solution, which should be a prompt, effective
and fair debt workout process. The code says, in
essence, that mechanisms are needed to bring all the
essential stakeholders into dialogue and negotiation in
order to resolve a debt crisis once it has begun, and
that various measures should be taken to prevent a
deteriorating situation from becoming a crisis. It
suggests some steps in that direction. These should be
vetted in dialogues involving the debt-issuing countries
themselves, whose representatives might have
proposals of their own to make about norms for their
own behaviour as well as for the creditors and
international institutions.
The need recognized above for a comprehensive
process also leaves open the question of who
coordinates it. Formally, it is the government of the
country in crisis itself and informally it may be IMF,
and there are drawbacks to both, as neither is a neutral
party (the former as debtor and the latter as creditor).
Another possibility that may be considered is
coordination by an independent facilitator or mediator,
who might be drawn from a pre-selected list of
individuals of high character and relevant experience,
identified through an international process, who agree
to serve in this capacity over a certain time period.
The facilitator, once activated, could be supported by
a small staff of lawyers and financial economists hired
for the case on hand, which could include staff of IMF
and the World Bank, and be serviced through the
administrative offices of the International Court of
Justice or another recognized independent legal body, 15 See Gitlin (2002).
VI
Where do we go from here?
such as the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law.
At the United Nations, where mediation plays a
large role in attempts to resolve political disputes, the
Secretary-General has suggested considering it in
addressing debt crises. He suggested “adding to the
menu available to debtor countries a mechanism for
the simultaneous, fair and full treatment of all of a
country’s foreign debt obligations, along with the
provision of required new funds by the international
community or other creditors. The use of such a
mechanism, which could be invoked under specified
conditions by a country already cooperating with IMF
and other international financial institutions, would
bring together committees representing bank creditors,
bondholders, the Paris Club and other bilateral official
creditors, as appropriate, plus the debtor Government”
(United Nations, 2000b, paragraph 125).
A mediation service for sovereign debt negotiations
has also been proposed as part of a broader Sovereign
Debt Forum. As presented by Richard Gitlin15 at a “side
event” of the Monterrey Conference on Financing for
Development, the Forum would serve two functions: first,
it would seek to enhance sovereign debt as an asset class
through discussions among market professionals of the
design of different lending instruments, seeking to identify
best practices; and second, it would facilitate sovereign
debt restructuring when requested by a debtor government,
helping with early communication among the relevant
parties and in organizing the parties into groups, and
making available a mediator from a standing panel.
Proposals such as these that attempt to facilitate
the comprehensive treatment of sovereign debt in crisis
countries seem to warrant a hearing. That they have
not yet had one may reflect their weaknesses, but also
possibly something about the agenda for debate. The
proposals discussed in this paper were supported by
the G-10 and its member States, staff of IMF and the
World Bank, or private financial organizations.
Developing and transition economy governments, in
particular, seem mainly to have reacted to proposals,
rather than initiate them. Could not officials from those
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countries, as well as the private sector and civil society,
be drawn into these debates more effectively and at an
earlier stage?
In fact, there are “Southern” initiatives. For
example, in June 2003 the Conference of African
Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development endorsed the proposal of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to
organize an International Conference on African Debt
Relief in early 2004. The ministers believed that “we
must move swiftly to meet the challenge of defining
the policies, instruments and initiatives that can
constitute the next step in the international community’s
efforts to reduce Africa’s debt burden” (ECA, 2003,
paragraph 28). African ministers are thus beginning to
think beyond HIPC and find it more convenient to do so
in a forum in Africa.
By the same token, it may also be fruitful to
facilitate North-South and debtor-creditor discussions
in more neutral and less consequential terrain than the
forums of the Bretton Woods institutions. Involving all
relevant stakeholders in a manner in which ideas might
float more freely and discussion turn more innovative
can only advance the dialogue.
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